Abstract-Lim et al. proposed a Hybrid Group Key Management scheme for Hierarchical Self-Organizing Sensor Network in 2008 to provide a secure way to pass down the group key for cluster-based communication. This paper presents two practical attacks on the scheme proposed by Lim et al. by tampering sensor nodes of a cluster to recover necessary secret keys and by exploiting the IDS employed by the scheme. The first attack enables a long-term but slow data fabrication while other attack causes more severe DoS on the access to cluster sensor nodes.
I. INTRODUCTION
WIRELESS Sensor Network (WSN) is widely deployed nowadays to monitor physical or environmental conditions in various applications ranged from civilian to military purposes. A wide coverage area WSN is normally formed by many base stations with a large number of selfconfiguring and self-organizing sensor nodes, which are small and have limited resources such as battery, power, computations and memory spaces constraints [1] . Therefore, key management handling in WSN is differed from those conventional wired or wireless networks. The design of WSN key management schemes relies on some crucial considerations such as reliable key distribution procedures, energy consumption, scalability and tamper resistant properties, as well as computation and storage overhead trade-off among participated entities.
To date, there are many efforts made by researchers in establishing group-wise keys for sensor nodes to communicate securely. In 2004, Park and Shin have employed the symmetric cryptography approach and presented the Lightweight Security Protocol (LiSP) [2] that offers key broadcast, lost keys detection/recovery and seamless key refreshment services through the rekeying mechanism. In 2005, Burmerster et al. have extended the ideas from asymmetric Diffie-Hellman protocol and presented a novel scalable Group Key Exchange protocol [3] that is able to defend passive adversary attacks. Also, Carman et al. have proposed an energy efficient and low latency asymmetric key management approach, ID-STAR [4] , which is built based on identity-based public key cryptography to fulfill the requirements of greater ranges, low probability of interception and anti-jamming in army sensor network.
In addition, Zhu et al. have introduced a symmetric key management protocol LEAP [5] for large scale sensor network. Instead of using a single keying mechanism, this protocol supports four diverse types of key establishments per sensor node: individual, pair-wise, cluster and group shared key. LEAP has achieved greater energy efficiency and is protected from various attacks, yet it does not sufficiently address the scalability problem in group key distribution and management. To enhance the scalability property, Lim et al. have presented a secure hybrid group key management (HGKM) [6] for hierarchical self-organizing sensor network in 2008.
In this paper, we show that HGKM is vulnerable to DoS attack and data fabrication by exploiting the features of IDS system [7] used in the scheme. The structure of this paper is organized as follows. We will first review the HGKM scheme in Section II. We then show how we could compromise the scheme in Section III. Finally we conclude by giving a summary.
II. LIM ET AL.'S SCHEME
HGKM is designed to operate on a sensor network that is based on a Hierarchical Self-Organizing Adhoc Network (SOHAN) [8] . In a SOHAN-based sensor network, there are three main components arranged in hierarchical architecture: Access Points (AP), Forwarding Nodes (FN) and Sensor Nodes (SN). The uppermost AP layer roles as a bridge between a wireless and wired environment, whereas the intermediate FN layer provides a wireless radio interface with the responsibility of routing sensed data from the lowest SN layer to the AP layer. Fig. 1 shows the model of SOHAN-based sensor network. 
• AP is always honest.
• FN or SN is not tamper resistant.
• Initial secret key K S pre-installed in all SN and AP 
D. Group Key Transport Phase
Right after the SNs has been deployed, GKT will be request by each SN in order to fetch the group key from the FN which the SN wish to connect with. GKT is also perform when SN want to switch to a different FN for any other reasons. confirmed that SN has received the correct key.
E. Group Key Refresh Phase
To reduce the risk of group key compromise, AP will first update the group key to FN via GKA. After that, FN will propagate the update to the SNs.
1) FN broadcast the new group key to its SNs by
securing the new group key with current group key.
2) SN performs decryption to recover K' G || SC' and compute if 1 + = SC SC . Then it verifies the MACs. If matches, the new group key is updated in SN and acknowledgement is sent to FN.
confirmed that SN has received the correct key.
III. ATTACKS ON HGKM
Each AP, FN and SN is pre-assigned with y/x key pairs and signed by a trusted CA. However, FN and SN can be easily compromised physically by an intruder to obtain the underlying sensitive secret keys. HKGM depends on LEACH-based [7] or other similar IDS to detect and isolate the compromised nodes, as well as to trigger the GKR process to generate new group key. LEACH divides n nodes in a cluster into n/m groups with m member nodes (MN). LEACH then detects data packet jamming, dropping and duplicating in the network by using MN to "overhear" in "prominous" mode. In case of SOHAN, since there is no inter-cluster communication for SNs, after SNs detected a malicious FN in their cluster, those SNs will need to reconnect to another trusted FN before they can report to the IDS to blacklist the compromised FN. This allows a window of opportunity for attack.
A. Data Fabrication

Fig. 2. Data Fabrication with Malicious SNs
In HGKM, the authors made an implicit naive assumption that GKT must be followed on all FNs, even the compromised one. However, in our case, we assumed custom-coded FN e s are used. This allows GKT to be skipped when interacting with unknown SNs which do not have valid certificates signed by CA.
The first step of our attack is to compromise some FNs and recover y FN /x FN and the current K G || SC. These keys are then loaded into FN e so that FN e s can take over the compromised FN and continue to work as normal. This will allow the FN e to avoid detection by the IDS. Since FN e have the necessary keys, it can continue to receive K' G updates from AP. Since FN e does not follow standard GKT in HKGM, we are able to deploy malicious SN e s to connect to FN e as depicted in Fig. 2 .
When FN e detected the existence of SN e , it will pass K G and subsequent K' G directly to SN e . This bypass DiffieHellman exchange and there will be no ID verification performed. With the valid group keys, SN e can then inject falsified data into the WSN passively as a long-term attack. Our first attack is purely passive and does not inflict serious damage on the WSN. In this section, we explain a DoS attack by exploiting the IDS. We only require the keys from a single FN and K S from SN. Again, we assumed multiple custom-coded FN e s are used and the same keys from a particular FN are pre-loaded into these FN e s. These FN e s are then deployed close to the FNs that we are going to attack. Recall that in GKA, GKT and GKR, none of the message exchanges include a timestamp.
B. Denial of Service
1) FN e s will first capture a valid message from these protocols and start to broadcast the message repeatedly for awhile.
2) The nearby SNs will detect duplicated packets from the FN. Since SNs cannot differentiate these packets are actually old packet, this will trigger the intrusion detection at SNs. 3) SNs will start to look for other FN to reconnect and since FN e is placed closely to FN, there is high probability that SNs will request GKT with FN e as shown in Fig. 3 .
Fig. 4. SNs Remained Connected to Malicious FNs
Since FN e can forge a valid GKT session with y FN /x FN and K S : 1) FN e is able to establish K FS with the stolen y FN /x FN by masquerading as an authentic FN. 2) FNe can pick any K G and SC and produce the valid MACs since it has the stolen K S and K FS .
FN e can also provide group key updates using GKR with the same keys: 1) FN e can encrypt K' G || SC' by using the K FS with the K G || SC passed in the previous GKT. 2) FN e can produce the required MACs since it has K S , K FS and K G || SC 3) K' G does not necessary come from AP. As long as S C ' =S C + 1 , SN will accept any arbitrary K' G as a valid update.
After SNs is connected to FN e , it will continue to forward data but the data will be dropped by the AP since it is using an invalid group key. This will go undetected by the SNs since SNs only monitor the FN in their cluster. Furthermore, FN e can perform valid GKR periodically and keep the SNs connected to it. After some time, new FNs maybe deployed to replace the blacklisted FNs.
However GKT is always initiated by SN, these new FNs cannot force SNs to join their cluster as shown in Figure 4 . This results a DoS as the base stations can no longer get data from these SNs.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have shown that the scheme is not secure and can be practically attacked. HKGM has a dependency on IDS therefore security is not guaranteed. Furthermore, since K S is subject to compromise, it should not be used for longterm verification. In addition, we feel that HKGM may not be very efficient in term of energy usage due to many exponentials and asymmetric encryption operations involved. On top of that, there is also a hidden energy cost of ID verification against the CA-signed certificate for each GKA/GKT/GKR process.
There is still much work to be done to improvise the scheme so that the attacks could be patch and to make the scheme more efficient by either simply the scheme or reduce the number of cryptographic computation required.
